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OLIVERI v. DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1 June 1988 
849F.2d 742 
The same preset value discount rate used in diminishing awards for future pecuniary losses should be used in diminishing 
awards for future pain and suffering. 
FACTS: A licensed third assistant engineer brought an action 
against the shipowner, Midland Ross Corporation <Midland), 
under the Jones Act to recover damages for injuries to his foot 
suffered while working on a vessel. The district court admitted 
testimony by a union representative as to the probable loss of 
future wages and promotional benefits of an average new 
member. The judge instructed the jury that it did not have to 
accept the testimony and also that it was to render an unadjusted 
award for both future pecuniary and non-pecuinary loss. The 
jury awarded $240,000 for lost future earnings and $50,000 for 
future pain and suffering. The judge subsequently deducted 2'k 
from the award for present value discount purposes. Delta ap­
pealed on the grounds that evidence regarding Oliveri's future 
earning capacity was improperly admitted and that the present 
value discount calculation was incorrectly performed. 
ISSUES: 1. Is testimony from an official of the union, which 
the injured plaintiff was barred from joining, admissible as 
evidence to ascertain the lost expected earnings? 
2. Whether the same present value discount value 
rate employed in diminishing awards for future pecuniary los­
ses should also be used in diminishing awards for future pain 
and suffering? 
ANALYSIS: 1. The Court of Appeals admitted the testimony 
as evidence stating that the court has wide discretion in deciding 
to admit testimony of any witness. Admissions of such testimony 
will more likely be upheld when the evidence used to establish 
lost future pecuniary gains is backed by empirical evidence such 
as wage scales and contracts of employment. The data presented 
to the jury must be sufficiently clear so that the jury could 
reasonably assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and sal­
ary incrementation over the years. Furthermore, the court must 
clearly instruct the jury that they may disregard any parts of or 
the entire testimony of a witness. 
2. The Court of Appeals remanded to the lower 
court only the issue of the proper calculation of the discount rate 
for future pecuniary loss, holding the lower court erred when it 
reduced the jury award by a one time flat 29l- deduction from the 
total amount. The court cannot take away this prerogative from 
the jury without stipulation from both parties. The Court of 
Appeals did not find such stipulation, and therefore the issue of 
the present value discount to be deducted was to be retned 
before a new jury. This amount would be deducted from the 
lump sum award of the previous jury. 
The two components to this deduction are the projected infla­
tion rate, and the projected rate of return on a risk free invest-
ment over the period the plaintiff would lose his expected wages. 
Given this, the amount that the jury awards is deemed as taking 
the discount rate into consideration. However, if by party stipu­
lation the discounting is left to the judge then the court must 
instruct the jury not to incorporate discounting in their calcula­
tion. The judge will calculate it using the 2% per year standard. 
Furthermore, if the plaintiff shows that the jury, despite the 
instructions of the court, incorporated the discount rate in their 
final award the judge had to accept this and not further di­
minish award. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's determination 
of a one time, 2% reduction of the jury award for non-pecuniary 
future loss. The court acknowledged that several older decisions 
from this circuit held contrary to imposing any kind of reduction 
of lost future non-pecuniary gain. See Alexander N ash-Kelvinator 
Corp., 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959); Yodice v. Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Stoombot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 
1971); and Rapisardi v. United Fruit Co., 441 F.2d 1308 <2d Cir. 
1971). However, starting with Chiarello v. Domenico Bus Service 
Inc., 542 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that "diseount­
ing was not only appropriate but preferable." I d. at 886. InMetz v. 
United Technologies Corp., 754 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1985), the court 
set the rule that the discount rate used would be below the rate 
used when calculating lost pecuniary expectancy. "All that is 
essential is to reach a result that properly takes into account the 
time value of money." 764 F.2d at 68 n.3. The court, allowed the 
29l- reduction in the award to stand. Recognizing the discrepancy 
with the majority of other circuit and state courts, it went on to 
say that "[i]f we were writing on a clear slate, we might be 
inclined to accept the view of the other circuits and reject any 
discounting of future non-pecuniary losses. However, we are ob­
liged to reckon with the clear preference for discounting expres­
sed by this circuit ... " 849 F.2d at 751. 
The court allowed the award to be diminished in an express 
attempt not to prejudice the plaintiff here by ordering a new trial 
on this issue as well. The defendants, in trying to get as large a 
present value discounting as possible will seek to keep the calcu­
lation away from the court, and to present the jury with as high 
discount rate figures as possible in order to minimize the final 
award. Injured plaintiffs in seeking higher awards will try to 
have the court decide the issue. It seems that given the court's 
rationale, the acknowledgment of its minority view, and its in­
terest in keeping uniformity throughout the circuits, the court 
may be persuaded to follow the majority view in the future and 
not allow present value deduction on future pain and suffering 
losses. 
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